

Anonymous reveló los planes de Gran Bretaña para comprometer al ejército ruso



Los piratas informáticos del grupo internacional Anonymous publicaron en línea documentos internos de la empresa contratista de inteligencia británica ARK. Según ellos, ARK creó una unidad de “guerra de información” para que sus empleados refutaran datos sobre las acciones del ejército ruso en Siria. Se planeó difundir tales negaciones a través de los medios de comunicación y las redes sociales de la oposición en idioma ruso. El proyecto se llamó *Aurelius*.

Según los [datos publicados](#), ARK se estableció en los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en 2018. Su director ejecutivo es Alistair Harris. Él, según los piratas informáticos, es un ex agente del MI6 que realizó ataques químicos en Siria. Su empresa es uno de los contratistas del Fondo de Seguridad, Estabilidad y Prevención de Conflictos (CSSF) del gobierno británico. La facturación anual del fondo supera los 1200 millones de libras y las tareas de

la organización las establece el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional, que **incluye** a los líderes de la comunidad de inteligencia del Reino Unido.

El proyecto Aurelius, cuyos detalles fueron revelados por los piratas informáticos, se creó dentro de ARK y está involucrado en la agenda de los medios. Su propósito es refutar y dar una opinión alternativa sobre las acciones del ejército ruso en Siria.

"Sabemos que la presencia rusa en Siria es más costosa y menos exitosa de lo que admite el Kremlin", dice la presentación del proyecto Aurelius en los documentos ARK.

Según los autores del proyecto, debido al férreo control del Kremlin sobre las actividades de los medios de comunicación en Rusia, cualquier imagen del conflicto en Siria que sea reprobable para las autoridades rusas no llega a la audiencia. Aurelius pretende mostrar a los rusos una versión que denigra al ejército ruso.

Para ello, está previsto recopilar materiales no editados de la prensa de la oposición siria o instruir a los activistas de los medios de la oposición siria para que recopilen material "en bruto" que contradiga las declaraciones de la parte rusa.

Para llevar los materiales recopilados a la audiencia rusa, se planea involucrar a "activistas rusos" con base en Ucrania que tienen conexiones con los medios y líderes de opinión rusos.

"El equipo con sede en Ucrania distribuirá materiales terminados a los canales relevantes de las redes sociales de la oposición rusa, los principales medios de comunicación y los formadores de opinión", afirman los documentos.

No está claro en los documentos de Anonymous si Aurelius ya está funcionando o si solo está planeado lanzarlo.

Oficialmente, ARK está comprometida con la "paz mundial": ayuda a los gobiernos de países donde hay conflictos prolongados o se ha desarrollado una situación política y económica tensa. Los proyectos recientes incluyen "Mejora **de la seguridad pública** en Jordania" (oficiales de policía locales capacitados en el manejo de armas), "**Prevención y lucha contra el extremismo violento**" en el Medio Oriente, Asia y África.

El viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la Federación Rusa, Oleg Syromolotov, llama a ARK una compañía militar privada: tiene **conexiones** con pandillas en Siria y con ex oficiales de inteligencia británicos. Además, ARK financió a los Cascos Blancos, una organización que se posiciona como un destacamento de voluntarios para ayudar a los civiles sirios, pero que en realidad **realiza tareas controvertidas** con el dinero de la corona británica.

ARK ya se ha ocupado de la agenda de los medios. A través de los Cascos Blancos, la empresa puede estar involucrada en la publicación de un video falso sobre las consecuencias de un ataque químico en Siria. En el video, Hassan, un niño de 11 años, supuestamente recién salido de un ataque con municiones químicas, está siendo lavado en un hospital con agua de manguera contra incendios. RT luego rastreó a este niño y a su padre. Dijeron **que** la grabación fue puesta en escena y que el tipo fue utilizado a ciegas, sin el conocimiento de su padre.

A continuación transcribimos el material de **Anonymous**:

Caballos de Troya de HMG. El Grupo ARK DMCC

¡Saludos! Somos **Anonymous**.

Creemos firmemente que las personas tienen derecho a saber todas las operaciones neocoloniales que el Gobierno de Su Majestad (HMG) está realizando en todo el mundo, por lo que las hemos estado exponiendo sistemáticamente durante los últimos años. Trojan Horse Ops en Siria, Líbano, Rusia y los Balcanes Occidentales le muestra cada pequeño detalle sobre la forma en que Londres intenta ejercer su autoridad sobre otros países.

Lista completa de nuestras investigaciones

<https://telegra.ph/Ops-Integrity-Initiative-and-HMG-Trojan-Horse---FULL-Download-Archives-06-08>


Nuestras investigaciones han demostrado que **las agencias de inteligencia británicas utilizan el Fondo de Conflicto, Estabilidad y Seguridad como tapadera para realizar operaciones secretas** destinadas a provocar cambios, derrocar gobiernos y socavar a las autoridades en los países objetivo. CSSF emplea una amplia red de contratistas y está vinculada a las embajadas del Reino Unido en esos países objetivo.

La gente ha recibido una prueba clara de que Londres tiene su propia comprensión del desarrollo de la sociedad civil, que utiliza como tapadera para preparar a la próxima generación de activistas políticos pro-Reino Unido; de la libertad de prensa -básicamente un medio para realizar operaciones de propaganda negra; de brindar asistencia a las agencias de seguridad locales mediante la realización virtual de una toma de control hostil, etc. Para lograr sus objetivos, los británicos se rebajan tanto como para usar problemas con la recolección de basura, crisis de refugiados y otros proyectos aparentemente inofensivos.

Pisotean hipócritamente los pilares fundamentales de la sociedad mientras justifican sus acciones por la necesidad de luchar contra los sistemas autoritarios y apoyar la democracia. De hecho, no son más que titiriteros sin normas morales.

Los archivos altamente confidenciales de HMG han demostrado sin ambigüedades a todos que los verdaderos objetivos de sus proyectos partidistas son todo lo contrario de lo que declaran. Cuando dicen **Fomentar la Estabilidad Social**, en realidad se refieren a **fomentar la inestabilidad**. **Fortalecer los Mecanismos Democráticos** de hecho significa **debilitar** esos mecanismos, **la resiliencia comunitaria** no es más que dejar a la **comunidad indefensa** frente a los desafíos. **Counter Disinformation & Media Development** en realidad está **difundiendo desinformación y desarrollando medios de propaganda negra controlados por el gobierno británico**.

Incluso podemos cambiar el nombre del Fondo de Conflicto, Estabilidad y Seguridad a Fondo **Mundial de Inestabilidad, Inseguridad y Conflicto**. Las operaciones secretas de socavamiento de la CSSF son realizadas por ciertos Caballos de Troya o, más bien, bestias que acompañan a los Jinetes del Apocalipsis, presagios de la muerte, la guerra, el hambre y la peste.



Hoy declaramos la guerra a esas bestias y Caballos de Troya. Para ser absolutamente transparente, publicamos una lista completa de las organizaciones:

CSSF Retender – ITT Shortlist

1) ACTED	37) Global Rights Compliance	74) Peaceful Change initiative
2) Action Against Hunger	38) Harquebus Ltd	75) Penal Reform International
3) Adam Smith International	39) ICF Consulting Services Ltd	76) PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
4) AECOM INFRASTRUCTURE & ENVIRONMENT UK Ltd	40) IMC Worldwide Ltd	77) Public Administration International
5) Aegis Defence Services Ltd	41) InCoStrat	78) Royal United Services Institute
6) Agencia Consulting Ltd	42) Innovation and Insight FZE	79) Safelane Global Ltd
7) Aktis Strategy Limited	43) Institute for Strategic Dialogue	80) Saferworld
8) Albany Associates	44) Institute for War and Peace Reporting	81) Search for Common Ground
9) Alcis Holdings Ltd	45) Integrity Research and Consultancy	82) Siren Associates Ltd
10) American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative	46) International Advisory Services	83) SKA International Group
11) ARK Group DMCC	47) International Alert	84) Social Development Direct Ltd
12) Artios Global Ltd	48) International Republican Institute	85) Sovereign Global UK
13) Axiom International Limited	49) Internews Europe	86) SSSC
14) BBC Media Action	50) Interpeace	87) Stichting Mayday Rescue Foundation
15) BDO LLP	51) ISSEE	88) Stratagem Consulting Ltd.
16) Blumont International, Inc. (Blumont)	52) Itad Ltd	89) Sustainable Criminal Justice Solutions
17) Breakthrough Media	53) Kivu International Ltd	90) Tana Copenhagen ApS
18) British Council	54) Landell Mills Ltd	91) Tearfund
19) Cardno Emerging Markets (UK) Ltd (727470)	55) Levant7 DBA Sayara International	92) The Asia Foundation
20) CARE International UK	56) Lhasa Consulting FZE (trading as Altai Consulting)	93) The HALO Trust
21) Chemonics International Inc	57) M&C Saatchi	94) The Risk Advisory Group plc
22) Christian Aid	58) MAG	95) The Stabilisation Network DMCC
23) Člověk v tísni, o.p.s. (People in Need)	59) Maxwell Stamp	96) Thomson Reuters Foundation Group (DBA Reuters Foundation Consultants Limited)
24) Coffey International Development	60) Mercy Corps	97) Torchlight Group
25) Creative Associates International Inc	61) Minerva Advisory Group Limited	98) Transparency International
26) Crown Agents	62) Mott MacDonald	99) TRANSTEC
27) DAI Europe Ltd	63) New Century Consulting	100) Triple Line Consulting
28) Development Transformations, LLC	64) North South Consultants Exchange International Limited	101) Trócaire (Northern Ireland)
29) Ecorys UK Ltd	65) Northern Ireland Co-operation Overseas	102) Valar Frontier Solutions LLC
30) Farsight	66) Optima Defence & Security Group Limited	103) Voluntary Service Overseas
31) FCO Services	67) Overseas Development Institute	104) WESTMINSTER FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY LIMITED
32) FHI 360	68) Oxfam GB	105) Women for Women International (UK)
33) First Call Partners Ltd	69) Oxford Policy Management	106) World Vision
34) Forward Thinking	70) Pact	107) WYG Management Services Ltd
35) G4S	71) PAE Worldwide Inc	
36) Global Partners Governance	72) Palladium International Ltd	
	73) Peace Direct	

CSSF Retender - Lista corta de ITT. <https://ufile.io/pzu0krui>

Debes haber adivinado que comenzamos una serie de nuestras exposiciones con uno de los recortes de inteligencia más controvertidos. Su director ejecutivo es **Alistair Harris**, un ex agente del MI-6 que creó los Cascos Blancos, organizó los ataques químicos en Siria, organizó el apoyo de los medios a los yihadistas en Idlib, instaló un plan de operación de cambio de régimen en El Líbano, etc

Creemos que las personas tienen derecho a conocer las operaciones que **ARK Group DMCC** realizó en nombre de **HMG** no solo en Siria, Líbano y los Balcanes Occidentales, sino también en Yemen, Bahrein, Egipto, Irak, Jordania, Pakistán, Marruecos y Malí.

Comenzaremos con algunos archivos generales que ARK Group envió a FCDO y CSSF.

Archivos ARK para FCDO y CSSF

<https://telegra.ph/ARK-Group-DMCC-Files-for-FCDO-and-CSSF-12-07>

Descargar los archivos: <https://ufile.io/tqq7kbu9>

A continuación, pasamos a las operaciones de ARK Group en países específicos:

Siria (aquí también encontrará los documentos que publicamos anteriormente):

Archivos ARK sobre Siria

<https://telegra.ph/ARK-Group-DMCC-Files-on-Syria-12-07>

Descargar los archivos. <https://ufile.io/6hvldebj>

Archivos ARK sobre el Líbano

<https://telegra.ph/ARK-Group-DMCC-Files-on-Lebanon-12-07>

Descargar los archivos. <https://ufile.io/w8iiymsu>

Balcanes Occidentales y Cáucaso Sur

<https://telegra.ph/ARK-Group-DMCC-Files-on-Western-Balkans-and-South-Caucasus-12-07>

Descargar los archivos. <https://ufile.io/txd7v5bs>

Yemen

<https://telegra.ph/ARK-Group-DMCC-Files-on-Yemen-12-07>

Descargar los archivos. <https://ufile.io/h8ozdq9v>

Egipto, Baréin, Irak, Jordania, Libia, Pakistán (creemos que la comunidad pakistaní en Londres encontrará los documentos muy intrigantes), Marruecos y Malí.

<https://telegra.ph/ARK-Group-DMCC-Files-on-Egypt-Bahrain-Iraq-Jordan-Libya-Pakistan-Morocco-and-Mali-12-07>

Archivar con los archivos. <https://ufile.io/lnye9bwo>

Pacífico Sur y Ministerio del Interior

<https://telegra.ph/ARK-Group-DMCC-South-Pacific-and-Home-Office-Files-12-07>

Archivar con los archivos. <https://ufile.io/9e8f4w6q>

Y ahora te mostraremos algunos documentos exclusivos, que no hemos publicado antes. Vigilamos a los empleados de ARK, hicimos un seguimiento de su actividad y carrera. Y tenemos algunos archivos muy interesantes para mostrar a la gente.

Un ciudadano británico, **Amil Khan**, participó en el PROYECTO DE COMUNICACIONES ESTRATÉGICAS DE RESILIENCIA DE OPOSICIÓN

MODERADA (MOR) DE SIRIA, una de las iniciativas sirias de ARK y TGSN. La aportación clave de Amil Khan al proyecto fue su capacidad para comprender y anticipar los requisitos de los financiadores del gobierno del Reino Unido y aliados. Puedes saber más sobre él en su CV (solo para uso oficial):

Amil Khan
British citizen

Proposed Input – Amil brings experience of frontline journalism, television production, campaigning and political outreach to the project as well as the ability to understand and anticipate the requirements of UK and allied government funders.

Added value – Amil is a former Reuters Middle East foreign correspondent and BBC investigative journalist. He moved into the government communications sector after a 10-year career in journalism that saw him win three awards for covering war and extremism. In his first role, he headed the UK's flagship CVE project in Pakistan before returning to the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings to work on providing support to the Syrian opposition. Presently, when not engaged on Syria, he is regularly called upon to provide Middle East related communications and political advice to the Prime Minister's office. A member of Chatham House, he has written academic papers on communications and extremism, a book on the political philosophy of extremism and appears on UK and US media to discuss these topics regularly.

Relevant Experience

March 2017 – Present **UK**
Advisor, Government Communications Service

Lead engagement with leadership figures and decision makers from partner governments (Gulf states, Oman and Pakistan) seeking UK communications advice and support. Design support packages and negotiate implementation to meet HMG objectives

Jan 2017 – Present **Turkey/Jordan**
Director, Moderate Armed Opposition (MAO) communications support
Design and lead implementation of communications strategy behind the project to support the Syrian moderate armed opposition.

April 2011 - Dec 2012 **Pakistan**
Project Director, CVE Project Pakistan
Managing design and implementation of a project to undermine the narratives used by Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan.

Nov 2007 – Aug 2009 **UK**
Producer and Presenter, BBC Panorama
Plan, produce and present documentaries on BBC's premier documentary strand. Won awards for high-risk investigative films on Iraq, Sudan and Al Qaeda

Jan 2003 – Oct. 2006 **Middle East**
Reuters Middle East Correspondent
Covered economic and political events in the Middle East, including the invasion of Iraq and subsequent civil war, as well as conflict in Sudan and political upheaval in Egypt. Acting head of bureau in Sudan. Fast Track selected and trained

Education/Training

UK Civil Service: joint planning, working with the military, understanding conflict and stabilisation

BBC: Investigative film making, high risk film making, combat videography

Reuters: Fast Track training programme covering global politics and economics

University of Durham: Arabic and Farsi

University of Cambridge: Principles of Law (jurisprudence and international law)

Languages: Native English, fluent Arabic, fluent Urdu and basic Farsi

Este es su perfil en LinkedIn que todo el mundo puede ver (naturalmente, le faltan muchos detalles).

Contact

www.linkedin.com/in/amil-khan-181718173 (LinkedIn)

Top Skills

Qualitative Research
Data Research
Change Management

Amil Khan

Director at Valent Projects | Digital Communications for Good |
Technology and Creativity | Research and Implementation
London

Summary

Information and influence for positive change

Experience

Valent Projects

Director

January 2019 - Present (3 years)

London, United Kingdom

- Building a data-driven communications agency capable of successfully engaging social media giants and governments.
- Developing methodologies capable of finding and closing down malicious networks in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa
- Building teams capable of developing tech tools, running digital campaigns and investigating online manipulation

Chatham House

Associate Fellow

October 2017 - December 2019 (2 years 3 months)

London, United Kingdom

Research on the impact of peer-to-peer digital communications on political dynamics (populism, political insurgents, reform and interstate competition) in South Asia and the Middle East

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Strategic Communications Advisor to the Syrian opposition

February 2013 - April 2014 (1 year 3 months)

Istanbul, Turkey

Providing political communications advice and support during ongoing conflict and throughout diplomatic negotiations

BBC

Hostile Environments reporter and producer

October 2006 - December 2008 (2 years 3 months)

London, United Kingdom

Filming, producing and reporting on the conflicts in Darfur, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, as well as investigating terrorism and violent crime in the UK

Reuters

Correspondent

January 2003 - October 2006 (3 years 10 months)

Cairo Governorate, Egypt

Middle East correspondent based out of Cairo covering elections, conflict and terrorism in Iraq, Sudan, the Palestinian Territories

Various online and print publications

Freelance Journalist

September 2000 - December 2002 (2 years 4 months)

Cairo Governorate, Egypt

Freelance journalist working in Cairo, Jerusalem, Damascus and other Middle East news hotspots for the Middle East Times, the Guardian and a collection of UK and US radio and print outlets

Education

Durham University

Bachelor's degree, Arabic Language and Literature · (1995 - 1999)

Page 2 of 2

Perfil de LinkedIn de Amil Khan. <https://ufile.io/fvd6r3k8>

También es un respetable investigador en el Centro de Política Exterior.

Amil Khan

Research Fellow

Amil Khan is the founder of Valent Projects, a digital communications agency for social impact. Until recently, Amil was a UK government senior strategic communications expert with a special focus on international conflict. Amil advised several UK government departments as well as senior decision makers from governments across Middle East and Africa. His work has ranged from countering Disinformation to supporting complex socio-economic policy shifts. A former Chatham House associate fellow, Amil came to government after an award-winning career in journalism, working for the BBC and Reuters as a foreign correspondent and documentary film maker focusing on violent insurgencies in Iraq and Sudan. Since Valent's founding in late 2019, Amil has designed complex online research projects and developed and implemented data-based digital strategy for election candidates.



De hecho, hizo mucho trabajo sucio cuando formó parte de esos proyectos ARK y TGSN y operaciones de propaganda negra en Siria y países vecinos. Pero no fue el final de su carrera. Hemos descubierto otro proyecto sirio que él supervisó. Este es **Aurelius 2.0** y apunta a los rusos.

Project Aurelius

Project Overview:

Project Aurelius establishes and maintains the capability to increase the cost to the Russian leadership of sustained or increased intervention in the Syrian conflict by sensitising Russian public opinion to the opportunity costs of their government's intervention in the conflict.

1. Theory of Change:

Analysts have made a number of observations about the nature of the Russian leadership's propaganda efforts and foreign policy objectives.

Amongst these:

- **We know** economic conditions in Russia have been declining under Putin
- **We know** the Russian state seeking to distract attention from domestic issues by ramping up jingoistic sentiment
- **We know** the Kremlin's position is fragile. Whereas Russian audiences want to see their country projecting strength on the global stage, they do not want that to come at the cost of domestic prosperity or significant military cost.
- **We know** Russia's position in Syria is more costly and less successful than the Kremlin is admitting
- **We know** the Kremlin so tightly controls Russia's domestic media that public opinion remains unexposed to any depiction of events not in line with the government's wishes.
- **Therefore**, exposing Russians to the complicated reality their government faces in Syria is likely to complicate the government's present reliance on Syria as an "easy win" in terms of its wider domestic balancing act.

2. Methodology:

a. The basic mechanism to achieving Aurelius' theory of change revolves around leveraging the reality of Russian's Syria intervention as depicted in Syrian opposition media and presenting it to key Russian audiences, including mainstream news consumers.


b. Assets: We have a number of assets already available to build this mechanism. These include:

- Access to opposition-made media products showing Syrian actuality that refutes Russian claims
- The ability to task Syrian opposition media activists to capture raw material that undermines Russian claims
- International communications specialists in Amman with the ability to establish and manage the effort
- Potential points of entry into Russian mainstream media:
 - o Russian activists based in Ukraine with access to foreign journalists and opinion influencers with media profiles
 - o Activists able to establish and run Russian social media pages

- Access to Russian opposition social media networks

3. Structures:

- a. The structural overview is depicted in the diagram below



- b. The aggregation process involves a small team (possibly one person) in Amman compiling relevant - already published – products.
- c. The dissemination team is a collection of four Russian opposition activists with contacts with Russian opposition media, influential analysts, mainstream media and opposition networks.
- d. The dissemination team – headed by a lead activist – discusses product requirements with international specialists and decides weekly or daily needs based on Russian media environment
- e. Dissemination team draws up a distribution plan that aims to maximise negative impact on Russian narratives around the intervention in Syria

4. Operations:

- a. Aggregation Team
- Profile: a discreet presence in Amman. The team has no public-facing profile, as it has no public-facing function
 - Role: Monitoring multiple Syrian opposition media outlets, identifying products that undermine the Russian position, providing translations when necessary and sending on to the dissemination team
 - Membership:
 - International specialist as project director
 - Russian speaking aggregator and translator
- b. Dissemination team

- Profile: The dissemination team will be the primary and only public-facing element of the project. The team's public-facing profile will be that of a Russian anti-Kremlin activist collective. Individuals within the collective already have public profiles. The collective will not need a specific name or brand, but could stand up social media presences that have descriptive titles (e.g. "Syria Truth")
- Role: The team will analyse Russia state narratives around the Syrian intervention and request material from the aggregation team that undermines them. This material will then be socialised through social media networks, other activists and traditional journalists
- Membership:
 - Project manager: XXXX
 - Activist liaison: XXXX
 - Media/social media liaison: TBC
 - Fact checker/verification: XXXX

5. Financial administration

- a. A Syrian-run media activist group will be officially registered in Germany, where significant number of Syrian activists have taken up residence
- b. A Russian-run similar entity will be registered in Ukraine
- c. As a legal entity, the German registered organisation will be able to make payments to its Ukrainian counterpart. The payments will cover staff costs, running costs and necessary facilitation fees for traction with Russian media traction
- d. The initial funds will be paid into a Jordanian account. From there, they can either be paid directly to the German registered entity, or via a Syrian interlocutor, who ostensibly serves as a fundraiser, running crowd funding campaigns and eliciting donations from wealthy Syrians.

6. Operational Management

- a. Daily contact will be between Amman-based aggregator/translator and the project manager in the Ukraine. This will be conducted via Wickr
- b. Senior staff will provide strategic direction either via Wickr or secure electronic means. Contact will be with the Ukraine based project manager.
- c. The Ukraine-based project manager will be the only
- d. Further details of cyber security procedures, which will include secure laptops registered anonymously via prepaid credit cards, VPN systems and encrypted email and voice communication.

6. Processes:

- a. The dissemination team will carry out a narrative analysis using Syria-related material in the Russian media. As well as informing operations, it will be possible to produce daily and/or weekly analysis of coverage and narratives.
- b. This analysis will be discussed every morning with the Amman-based aggregator. Points of vulnerability of the Russian-state narrative will be

discussed. The aggregator will then identify appropriate Syrian opposition media products, translate from Arabic to Russian where necessary and post to a closed Facebook page/YouTube group. The Ukraine-based project manager, will pick the products up from the social media group.

- c. The Ukraine-based dissemination team will pick up the products and seed them to appropriate Russian opposition social media channels, opinion shapers, and traditional media outlets – as appropriate.
- d. The dissemination team will also have the capacity to develop some basic media products, such as infographics and rough-cut video products
- e. Information is used to generate opinion from experts, which can then be legitimately discussed by mainstream media
- f. Journalists engaged and sometimes facilitated to cover material

7. Russian media contacts

a. Opposition/liberal press: The outlets that comprise this section of the media environment are fairly small and tend to be registered outside of Russia. The audience is best-considered “alternative” and “intellectual”. Messages most likely to resonate will focus on the moderate and non-ISIL credentials of the FSA. Also, Syrian population’s growing hostility to Russia and Russians will provide raw material for anti-Kremlin views. Although this section of the media/popular opinion is not highly influential in itself, messages featured in this group can be leveraged elsewhere.

- Tier 1
 - www.openrussian.org
 - www.kasparov.ru
 - www.grani.ru
- Tier 2: Online media accessible through direct approach

b. Moderate opposition press: Comprised of outlets that are considered opposition, but are registered in Russia and therefore subject to Kremlin pressure. Intellectuals make up the largest segment of the audience for this group. Although the audience is small, it is influential amongst opinion makers, particularly in other media.

- Tier 1
 - www.echo.msk.ru
 - www.tvrain.ru
 - www.novayagazeta.ru
- Tier 2
 - www.newtimes.ru
 - www.znak.com
 - www.fontanka.ru

c. Objective press: This group contains Russian ‘neutrals’; those who are not convinced by the Kremlin’s arguments, but not automatically hostile to them.

Appealing to this group requires proof and fact. Arguments should be based around impact on Russia's wider interests; for example, the risk of increasing domestic terrorism or economic isolation on living standards. This section of the media landscape is the most professional. It might not have high audience figures, but information carried by outlets is considered credible enough by others to be reused or quoted.

- Tier 1
 - www.rbc.ru
 - www.newsru.com
 - www.rosbalt.ru
 - www.kommersant.ru
 - www.profile.ru
 - www.meduza.io
- Tier 2
 - www.livejournal.com/magazine

d. Mostly pro-government media: The audience for this group tends to be “patriotic” Russians of the lower socio-economic demographic. Sentiments are pro-authoritarian, pro-Russian imperialism and anti-Western. This group is the most closely aligned with the Kremlin's Syria policy. This is the hardest group to reach, but the impact on the government would be the most profound. This group may support present policy on the basis of the information they have, but that is not a guarantee that they will continue to support the same policies if they were seen to impact their immediate interests.

- Tier 1
 - www.mk.ru
 - www.kp.ru
 - www.lenta.ru
- Tier 2
 - Out of scope and interest

e. Directly controlled pro-government media: Direct transmission of coverage requirements is not possible, however, the project will be able to exert indirect influence with the aim of securing coverage of related events. The ‘chain effect’ is a likely approach. Using this method, the project will be able to seed information in the non-mainstream liberal press, analysts and activists will respond and the this section of the press can be persuaded to cover the response, thereby indirectly drawing attention to the original news/revelation.

Proyecto Aurelio 2.0

<https://ufile.io/b4oiv6ct>

¿No es un plan curioso? Amil Khan tenía la intención de usar propaganda negra *para aumentar el costo para los líderes rusos de una intervención sostenida o incrementada en el conflicto sirio por parte de...* y así sucesivamente. Encontrará una lista bastante estándar de mensajes que los

medios rusos tienen que enviar al pueblo ruso. Cabe señalar que tuvo acceso a los productos de los medios de comunicación fabricados por la oposición en Siria y tuvo la oportunidad de utilizar a los activistas de los medios de la oposición siria para recopilar contenido sin procesar que podría usar para socavar las afirmaciones de Rusia. Bueno, ya sabemos que ARK, TGSN, IncoStrat y otros prepararon a todos esos activistas 'honestos'.

<https://thegrayzone.com/2020/09/23/syria-leaks-uk-contractors-opposition-media/>

Normalmente, el contenido de los medios que utilizaron para contrarrestar la agenda rusa fue preparado por Amil Khans, James Le Mesuriers, Charles Barretts, Sarah Toshes, Alistair Harris y similares. Astuto, ¿no?

Mientras Amil Khan tenía su sede en Amman (Jordania) supervisó la actividad de los activistas rusos con base en Ucrania. Los activistas pueden establecer y administrar páginas de redes sociales rusas y tener acceso a las redes sociales de la oposición rusa. La información fue agregada por Amil Khan en Amman y difundida por cuatro activistas de la oposición rusa con contactos en los medios de la oposición rusa, analistas destacados, medios de comunicación y redes de la oposición.

La administración financiera también era bastante complicada para evitar que alguien descubriera la verdadera fuente del dinero. Incluía una entidad legal registrada en Alemania, su contraparte ucraniana, cuentas jordanas, donaciones obligatorias de sirios ricos disfrazadas de campañas de recaudación de fondos.

Y ahora la historia se pone mucho más interesante. ¿Tiene alguna idea de en qué se dedica actualmente **Valent Projects Ltd. con Amil Khan como su director?**


Our Clients

We work with clients in the UK and all over the world to counter disinformation and strengthen the bonds between people. Here are some of our clients.



British Council

We've worked alongside the British Council to help Lebanese institutions learn to and engage with young audiences on social media.



Amnesty International

We've trained activists from 180+ authoritarian regimes to be more effective on social media.



ISD

We've worked with ISD to research violent actors using the 'dark web' to mobilise recruits and threaten public figures in Europe.



DT Global

We've investigated the reach and impact of disinformation techniques in a country facing severe political instability.



Ella Baker Center

We've developed a social media strategy for the Ella Baker Center in California that relied on organic content and ads to identify and engage US audiences interested in social justice issues.



Royal Institution

We've developed and implemented a data-led behaviour change campaign aimed at understanding and working with the psychological drivers behind anti-voter sentiment in the UK.



Prince's Trust

We've helped the Prince's Trust reimagine its social media engagement strategies to be 'digital first', align with the habits and practices of the young people the organisation serves.



LLGCC

We've developed a training programme to help Labour election candidates improve their digital campaigning capabilities.



Thomson Reuters Foundation

We've worked with TRF to develop best practice guidelines for independent media outlets.




Labour Together

We've carried out a forensic reverse engineering of the UK Conservative Party's digital strategy during the 2019 election as part of Labour Together's election review.

No, no hay error. **El Partido Laborista** es uno de sus clientes. seguramente, el Laborismo usó toda una serie de campañas de desprestigio para destruir el único político honesto entre ellos: Jeremy Corbyn y su equipo. Y después de eso, contrataron cabrones como Amil Khan; de hecho, bien podría llamarse un criminal de guerra responsable de las operaciones de propaganda negra y miles de muertes en el Medio Oriente.

Este es el pico de la hipocresía.



The Social Liberal Forum is the home of Social Liberalism in Britain. We campaign for a Citizens' Britain, one characterised by a massive transfer of power from remote and unaccountable corporations and state institutions to people and their communities. We do this because we believe individuals and communities should shape their own destinies and live a good life as they see it, unfettered by the power and control of others; and that when this happens it produces the best outcomes for people and planet.

www.socialliberal.net



Labour Together is a network for activists from all traditions of the Labour movement to explore new ideas and thinking on the future of the Left. The original research for this report was commissioned as part of Labour Together's Election Review.

www.labourtogether.uk



Compass is a think tank and a home for those who want to build and be part of a Good Society; one where equality, sustainability and democracy are not mere aspirations but a living reality.

www.compassonline.org.uk



ValentProjects

Valent Projects is a digital communications agency for positive social impact. Our job is to help campaigns, movements, institutions and businesses working for a fairer, greener and more equitable world thrive in the new information environment.

www.valent-projects.com

Foreword



Following Dominic Cummings' departure from Downing Street, and the defeat of Donald Trump, some on the progressive side of British politics believe that there has been enough analysis of what happened in 2019, and that we as opposition parties can get "back to normal" in our electoral campaigning.

We believe this to be a mistaken view. If we fail to understand the 2019 election, we run the risk of the Conservatives remaining in Downing Street throughout the 2020s - a critical decade, in which Britain will need to recover from a pandemic, find a meaningful response to climate breakdown, face the challenges of the fourth industrial revolution, and decide whether our family of nations has a future.

The findings Amil Khan and his team at Valent Projects have brought together indicate that the Conservative Party has made a step change in its digital and data capabilities - restructuring its election operations, redesigning its data strategies, and (while not losing sight of some of the proven approaches) radically reinventing its communications channels and outputs. The Conservatives might not repeat everything they did in 2019, but they will certainly not go backwards on this front between now and the next general election. As progressive parties, we must make a significant step up.

Our three organisations occupy different points on the progressive spectrum, but this report represents a challenge to us all - and to every progressive party and voice in the country - that no one can afford to ignore. We have to understand how the right are using emerging digital spaces and, rooted in our own values, explore how we can better communicate and engage with the people we wish to represent.

Neal Lawson, Compass
Jon Alexander, Social Liberal Forum
Hannah O'Rourke, Labour Together



Si bien esto se parece al proyecto Aurelius:



Labour Local Government Campaigns

Quote for Services

January 2021

Overview:

Valent Projects is proposing providing digital communications support services to Labour Local Government Campaigns Cooperative (LLGCC). This support is envisaged as two work streams:

- Producing and delivering a two-day digital campaigning masterclass for Labour councillors
- Producing the following digital products for LLGCC's general operational needs:
 - Logo (along with accompanying colour palette and brand guidelines)
 - One publicity brochure, utilising the logo, brand guidelines etc
 - Design and build LLGCC's website

Workstreams:

Digital Campaigning Masterclass:

- Prepare a course that gives individuals with little previous experience of professional social media use practical skills and knowledge to improve their ability to campaign in elections
 - Social Media Infrastructure: including, setting up Facebook business accounts (including political permissions), targeting by geography/demography/interests, learning from ads analytics
 - Social Media Content Creation: including, visual storytelling, smartphone filming, video editing "grammar" for social media, utilising different post types (Stories/Posts/Premieres/Reels etc)

NOTE: The masterclass will revolve around equipping trainees to start building audiences that they can continue to refine over time even if further support is minimal.


Digital Products for LLGCC:

- Logo:
 - Design conceptualisation, execution and two revisions
 - Deliverables includes logo in multiple arrangements and formats, colour palette and brand guidelines to aid client's use
- Brochure:
 - Copy and imagery provided by client
 - Design conceptualisation, execution and one revision
 - Delivery will be in an editable format so client can amend copy as needed and reuse
- Website:
 - Work with client to develop a wireframe
 - Client provides copy and imagery (or use of rights free imagery)



Layla's Twitter Engagement:

Layla Moran - Twitter interactions over past 7 days - Fig. 1



Key Points:

- Layla's Twitter account (on the far left of Fig. 1) is popular within a bubble of Libdem accounts; however, as can be seen by the tangle of accounts in the centre of the diagram, her account gains significant attention from a few influencer accounts who give her considerable reach beyond her core audience

Key Influencer Accounts for Layla Moran: (three main 'nodes' visible in Fig. 1)



¿Alguno de ustedes dudó que usarán la experiencia que ganaron en el Medio Oriente y Rusia contra el pueblo británico?



Royal Institution: Counter Pseudoscience Project

Costed Project Outline: Two-phase social media project comprising of multi-strand research and media campaign

February, 2021

Background:

Valent Projects is a digital communications company that focuses on social impact. Based in West London, the company has conducted extensive research and implementation work in the area of Disinformation and malign influence in the UK and abroad, including:

- Researching the [spread of 5G conspiracy theories](#) for submission to a parliamentary inquiry
- Investigating the [use of Disinformation in the 2019 UK general election campaign](#)
- Investigating Disinformation and supporting newly democratising governments deal with the phenomenon (for USAID)

Overview:

Valent Projects is proposing a two-phase project designed to curb the influence of pseudoscience material online, with specific emphasis on Coronavirus-related ‘anti-vaxxing’ sentiment. The project ultimately seeks to develop an understanding of the psychological drivers behind the generation and spread of anti-vaxxer narratives, which will also be relevant to broader pseudoscience narratives, and use this understanding to develop and test public messaging responses. The findings from this project can be used to inform other programming by Challenging Pseudoscience at the Ri as well as other stakeholders including the science community and concerned governments and public health bodies.

The first phase of the project will comprise research - both online and ethnographic. The second phase will focus on using the insight provided by the research to design an intervention in collaboration with YouTuber Abigail Thorn who runs the highly popular channel Philosophy Tube.

The online data and ethnographic research components are envisaged to complement each other. The online research allows the project to identify target audience(s) through their online engagement with the topic and then examine their demographic profiles. The ethnographic component of the research then conducts a deep-dive investigation that allows us to understand the psycho-social underpinnings of the audience’s views.

Along with Valent Projects, the partners collaborating on this project are:

- TellTale Research - Ethnographic research
- Abigail Thorn - YouTuber
- Challenging Pseudoscience at the Ri
- A number of online research software companies will also be engaged including Graphika, Newswhip and Murmurate

Archivos de la Campaña Laboral de Valent Proyectos:

1. <https://ufile.io/ahj394jb>
2. <https://ufile.io/fbmbj3b>
3. <https://ufile.io/fak5xdbu>
4. <https://ufile.io/ovqakmcj>
5. <https://ufile.io/a56wknuw>

Y por supuesto, conozca a Amil Khan:



Les hemos anunciado muchas veces que tarde o temprano HMG fortaleció toda su maquinaria neocolonial contra los ciudadanos británicos. Bueno, ahora tienes pruebas de que ya lleva bastante tiempo.

Encontrará muchos más datos interesantes sobre HMG y su contratista ARK en los documentos que hemos publicado.

Aquí está el archivo que contiene todos los archivos que hemos publicado sobre ARK.

<https://ufile.io/tnba6yyw>

Esta vez no hicimos una revisión detallada de los archivos, por lo que sus artículos serán la principal fuente de información veraz para las personas de todo el mundo. Todos ustedes, que tratan de llegar a la raíz del asunto, que no tienen miedo de exponer los crímenes de Estado contra la democracia, ¡sepan que estamos a su lado!

Y por tradición, dejamos que HMG y sus mercenarios tengan los nervios rotos esperando nuestra próxima publicación...

Somos anónimos. Somos legión.

Nosotros no perdonamos. Ni olvidamos.